Sunday, July 29, 2007

The Real Transformers


Stephen Lewis
Mertz Programmed for kindly conversation.


The Real Transformers
By ROBIN MARANTZ HENIG

I was introduced to my first sociable robot on a sunny afternoon in June. The robot, developed by graduate students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was named Mertz. It had camera sensors behind its eyes, which were programmed to detect faces; when it found mine, the robot was supposed to gaze at me directly to initiate a kind of conversation. But Mertz was on the fritz that day, and one of its designers, a dark-haired young woman named Lijin Aryananda, was trying to figure out what was wrong with it. Mertz was getting fidgety, Aryananda was getting frustrated and I was starting to feel as if I were peeking behind the curtain of the Wizard of Oz.
Mertz consists of a metal head on a flexible neck. It has a childish computer-generated voice and expressive brows above its Ping-Pong-ball eyes — features designed to make a human feel kindly toward the robot and enjoy talking to it. But when something is off in the computer code, Mertz starts to babble like Chatty Cathy on speed, and it becomes clear that behind those big black eyes there’s truly nobody home.
In a video of Aryananda and Mertz in happier times, Aryananda can be seen leaning in, trying to get the robot’s attention by saying, “I’m your mother.” She didn’t seem particularly maternal on that June day, and Mertz didn’t seem too happy, either. It directed a stream of sentences at me in apparently random order: “You are too far away.” “Please teach me some colors.” “You are too far away.”
Maybe something was wrong with its camera sensor, Aryananda said. Maybe that was why it kept looking up at the ceiling and complaining. As she fiddled with the computer that runs the robot, I smiled politely — almost as much for the robot’s sake, I realized, as for the robot maker’s — and thought: Well, maybe it is the camera sensor, but if this thing wails “You are too far away” one more time, I’m going to throttle it.
At the Humanoid Robotics Group at M.I.T., a robot’s “humanoid” qualities can include fallibility and whininess as much as physical traits like head, arms and torso. This is where our cultural images of robots as superhumans run headlong into the reality of motors, actuators and cold computer code. Today’s humanoids are not the sophisticated machines we might have expected by now, which just shows how complicated a task it was that scientists embarked on 15 years ago when they began working on a robot that could think. They are not the docile companions of our collective dreams, robots designed to flawlessly serve our dinners, fold our clothes and do the dull or dangerous jobs that we don’t want to do. Nor are they the villains of our collective nightmares, poised for robotic rebellion against humans whose machine creations have become smarter than the humans themselves. They are, instead, hunks of metal tethered to computers, which need their human designers to get them going and to smooth the hiccups along the way.
But these early incarnations of sociable robots are also much more than meets the eye. Bill Gates has said that personal robotics today is at the stage that personal computers were in the mid-1970s. Thirty years ago, few people guessed that the bulky, slow computers being used by a handful of businesses would by 2007 insinuate themselves into our lives via applications like Google, e-mail, YouTube, Skype and MySpace. In much the same way, the robots being built today, still unwieldy and temperamental even in the most capable hands, probably offer only hints of the way we might be using robots in another 30 years.
Mertz and its brethren — at the Humanoid Robotics lab, at the Personal Robotics Lab across the street in another M.I.T. building and at similar laboratories in other parts of the United States, in Europe and in Japan — are still less like thinking, autonomous creatures than they are like fancy puppets that frequently break down. But what the M.I.T. robots may lack in looks or finesse, they make up for in originality: they are programmed to learn the way humans learn, through their bodies, their senses and the feedback generated by their own behavior. It is a more organic style of learning — though organic is, of course, a curious word to reach for to describe creatures that are so clearly manufactured.
Sociable robots come equipped with the very abilities that humans have evolved to ease our interactions with one another: eye contact, gaze direction, turn-taking, shared attention. They are programmed to learn the way humans learn, by starting with a core of basic drives and abilities and adding to them as their physical and social experiences accrue. People respond to the robots’ social cues almost without thinking, and as a result the robots give the impression of being somehow, improbably, alive.
At the moment, no single robot can do very much. The competencies have been cobbled together: one robot is able to grab a soup can when you tell it to put it on a shelf; another will look you in the eye and make babbling noises in keeping with the inflection of your voice. One robot might be able to learn some new words; another can take the perspective of a human collaborator; still another can recognize itself in a mirror. Taken together, each small accomplishment brings the field closer to a time when a robot with true intelligence — and with perhaps other human qualities, too, like emotions and autonomy — is at least a theoretical possibility. If that possibility comes to pass, what then? Will these new robots be capable of what we recognize as learning? Of what we recognize as consciousness? Will it know that it is a robot and that you are not?
The word “robot” was popularized in 1920, in the play “Rossum’s Universal Robots,” commonly called “R.U.R.,” by the Czech writer Karel Capek. The word comes from the Czech “robota,” meaning forced labor or drudgery. In the world of R.U.R., Robots (always with a capital R) are built to be factory workers, meaning they are designed as simply as possible, with no extraneous frills. “Robots are not people,” says the man who manufactures them. “They are mechanically more perfect than we are, they have an astounding intellectual capacity, but they have no soul.” Capek’s Robots are biological, not mechanical. The thing that separates them from humans is not the material they are made of — their skin is real skin; their blood, real blood — but the fact that they are built rather than born.
What separates the current crop of humanoid robots from humans is something harder to name. Because if roboticists succeed in programming their machines with a convincing version of social intelligence, with feelings that look like real feelings and thoughts that look like real thoughts, then all our fancy notions about our place in the universe start to get a little wobbly.
Eliminating the Cognition Box
We already live with many objects that are, in one sense, robots: the voice in a car’s Global Positioning System, for instance, which senses shifts in its own location and can change its behavior accordingly. But scientists working in the field mean something else when they talk about sociable robots. To qualify as that kind of robot, they say, a machine must have at least two characteristics. It must be situated, and it must be embodied. Being situated means being able to sense its environment and be responsive to it; being embodied means having a physical body through which to experience the world. A G.P.S. robot is situated but not embodied, while an assembly-line robot that repeats the same action over and over again is embodied but not situated. Sociable robots must be both, as well as exhibiting an understanding of social beings.
The push for sociable robots comes from two directions. One is pragmatic: if Bill Gates is right and the robots are coming, they should be designed in a way that makes them fit most naturally into the lives of ordinary people. The other is more theoretical: if a robot can be designed to learn the same way natural creatures do, this could be a significant boost for the field of artificial intelligence.
Both pragmatism and theory drive Rodney Brooks, author of “Flesh and Machines,” who until the end of last month was director of M.I.T.’s Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, home to the Humanoid Robotics lab that houses Mertz. Brooks is an electric, exaggerated personality, an Australian native with rubbery features and bulgy blue eyes. That mobile face and Aussie accent helped turn him into a cult figure after the 1997 theatrical release of “Fast, Cheap & Out of Control,” a documentary by Errol Morris that featured Brooks — along with a wild animal trainer, a topiary gardener and an expert in naked mole rats — as a man whose obsessions made him something of a misfit, a visionary with a restless, uncategorizable genius.
As Brooks sat with me in his office and reflected on his career from the vantage point of a 52-year-old about to return to full-time research — a man going through what he called “a scientific midlife crisis” — a theme emerged. Each time he faced a problem in artificial intelligence, he said, he looked for the implicit assumption that everyone else took for granted, and then he tried to negate it. In the 1980s, the implicit assumption was that abstract reasoning was the highest form of intelligence, the one that programmers should strive to imitate. This led to a focus on symbolic processing, on tough tasks like playing chess or solving problems in algebra or calculus. Tasks that, as Brooks slyly put it in “Flesh and Machines,” “highly educated male scientists found challenging.”
But Brooks wanted to build an artificial intelligence system that did the supposedly simple things, not mental acrobatics like chess but things that come naturally to any 4-year-old and that were eluding the symbolic processing capabilities of the computers. These cognitive tasks — visually distinguishing a cup from a chair, walking on two legs, making your way from bedroom to bathroom — were difficult to write into computer code because they did not require an explicit chain of reasoning; they just happened. And the way they happened was grounded in the fact that the 4-year-old had a body and that each action the child took provided more sensory information and, ultimately, more learning. This approach has come to be known as embodied intelligence.
That’s where the robots came in. Robots had bodies, and they could be programmed to use those bodies as part of their data gathering. Instead of starting out with everything they needed to know already programmed in, these robots would learn about the world the way babies do, starting with some simple competencies and adding to them through sensory input. For babies, that sensory input included seeing, touching and balancing. For robots, it would mean input from mechanical sensors like video cameras and gyroscopes.
In 1993, Brooks started to develop a new robot, a humanoid equipped with artificial intelligence, according to this new logic. His motivation was more theoretical than practical: to offer a new way of thinking about intelligence itself. Most artificial-intelligence programs at the time were designed from the top down, connecting all relevant processes of a robot — raw sensory input, perception, motor activity, behavior — in what was called a cognition box, a sort of centralized zone for all high-level computation. A walking robot, for instance, was programmed to go through an elaborate planning process before it took a step. It had to scan its location, obtain a three-dimensional model of the terrain, plan a path between any obstacles it had detected, plan where to put its right foot along that path, plan the pressures on each joint to get its foot to that spot, plan how to twist the rest of its body to make its right foot move and plan the same set of behaviors for placing its left foot at the next spot along the path, and then finally it would move its feet.
Brooks turned the top-down approach on its head; he did away with the cognition box altogether. “No cognition,” he wrote in “Flesh and Machines.” “Just sensing and action.” In effect, he wrote, he was leaving out what was thought to be the “intelligence” part of “artificial intelligence.” The way Brooks’s robot was designed to start walking, he wrote, was “by moving its feet.”
This was the approach that Brooks and his team used to design their humanoid robot. This one couldn’t walk. The robot, named Cog, was stationary, a big man-size metal torso with big man-size arms that spanned six and a half feet when extended. But it was designed to think. Perched on a pedestal almost three feet high, it seemed to hulk over its human creators, dominating the Humanoid Robotics lab from 1993 until it was retired 11 years later and put on permanent display at the M.I.T. Museum. (It has been lent out as part of a traveling exhibit, “Robots + Us,” currently at the Notebaert Nature Museum in Chicago.) Its presence was disarming, mostly because it was programmed to look at anything that moved. As one visitor to the lab put it: “Cog ‘noticed’ me soon after I entered its room. Its head turned to follow me, and I was embarrassed to note that this made me happy.”
Cog was designed to learn like a child, and that’s how people tended to treat it, like a child. Videos of graduate students show them presenting Cog with a red ball to track, a waggling hand to look at, a bright pink Slinky to manipulate — the toys children are given to explore the world, to learn some basic truths about anatomy and physics and social interactions. As the robot moved in response to the students’ instructions, it exhibited qualities that signaled “creature.” The human brain has evolved to interpret certain traits as indicators of autonomous life: when something moves on its own and with apparent purpose, directs its gaze toward the person with whom it interacts, follows people with its eyes and backs away if someone gets too close. Cog did all these things, which made people who came in contact with it think of it as something alive. Even without a face, even without skin, even without arms that looked like arms or any legs at all, there was something creaturelike about Cog. It took very little, just the barest suggestion of a human form and a pair of eyes, for people to react to the robot as a social being.
In addition, Cog was programmed to learn new things based on its sensory and motor inputs, much as babies learn new things by seeing how their bodies react to and affect their surroundings. Cog’s arm motors, for instance, were calibrated to respond to the weight of a held object. When a student handed a Slinky to Cog, the oscillators in its elbowlike joints gave feedback about the toy’s weight and position. After a few hours of practice, the robot could make the Slinky slither by raising and lowering its arms. If it was given a heavier Slinky or a drumstick, it would be able to adjust its motions accordingly. The learning was minimal, but it was a start — and it was, significantly, learning derived from the input of motors, gears and oscillators, the robot equivalent of muscles.
Cog was able to learn other things too, including finding and naming objects it had never seen before. (The robot had microphones for ears and was equipped with some basic speech recognition software and an artificial voice.) But while Brooks showed a kind of paternal delight in what the robot could do, he was hesitant to give it the label of “learning” per se. “I am so careful about saying that any of our robots ‘can learn,’ ” he wrote in an e-mail message. “They can only learn certain things, just like a rat can learn only certain things and a chimpanzee can only learn certain things and even [you] can only learn certain things.” Even now, 14 years after the Cog project began, each of today’s humanoid robots can still only learn a very small number of things.
Cynthia Breazeal came to Brooks’s lab as a graduate student in 1990 and did much of the basic computational work on Cog. In 1996, when it was time for Breazeal to choose a doctoral project, she decided to develop a sociable robot of her own. Her goals were as much pragmatic as theoretical; she said she hoped her robot would be a model for how to design the domestic robots of the future. The one she built had an animated head with big blue eyes, flirty lashes, red lips that curved upward or downward depending on its mood and pink ears that did the same. She called the robot Kismet, after the Turkish word for fate.
How Smart Can a Robot Be?
Kismet was the most expressive sociable robot built to that point, even though it consisted of only a hinged metal head on a heavy base, with wires and motors visible and eyes and lips stuck on almost like an afterthought. Breazeal is now 39 years old, an associate professor at M.I.T. and director of the Personal Robotics Group. She retains a polished, youthful prettiness, amplified these days by a late pregnancy with her third child. When she talks about Kismet, she is careful to call it “it” instead of a more animate pronoun like “he” or “she.” But her voice softens, her rapid-fire speech slows a little and it can be difficult to tell from her tone of voice whether she’s describing her robot or one of her two preschool-age sons.

The robot expressed a few basic emotions through changes in its facial expression — that is, through the positioning of its eyes, lips, eyebrows and pink paper ears. The emotions were easy for an observer to recognize: anger, fear, disgust, joy, surprise, sorrow. According to psychologists, these expressions are automatic, unconscious and universally understood. So when the drivers on Kismet’s motors were set to make surprise look like raised eyebrows, wide-open eyes and a rounded mouth, the human observer knew exactly what was going on.
Kismet’s responses to stimulation were so socially appropriate that some people found themselves thinking that the robot was actually feeling the emotions it was displaying. Breazeal realized how complicated it was to try to figure out what, or even whether, Kismet was feeling. “Robots are not human, but humans aren’t the only things that have emotions,” she said. “The question for robots is not, Will they ever have human emotions? Dogs don’t have human emotions, either, but we all agree they have genuine emotions. The question is, What are the emotions that are genuine for the robot?”
Unlike Cog’s, Kismet’s learning was more social than cognitive. What made the robot so lifelike was its ability to have what Breazeal called “proto-conversations” with a variety of human interlocutors. Run by 15 parallel computers operating simultaneously, Kismet was programmed to have the same basic motivations as a 6-month-old child: the drive for novelty, the drive for social interaction and the drive for periodic rest. The behaviors to achieve these goals, like the ability to look for brightly colored objects or to recognize the human face, were also part of Kismet’s innate program. So were the facial behaviors that reflected Kismet’s mood states — aroused, bored or neutral — which changed according to whether the robot’s basic drives were being satisfied.
The robot was a model for how these desires and emotions are reflected in facial expression and how those expressions in turn affect social interaction. Take the drive for novelty. With no stimulus nearby, Kismet’s eyes would droop in apparent boredom. Then a lovely thing happened. If there was a person nearby, she would see Kismet’s boredom and wave a toy in front of the robot’s eyes. This activated Kismet’s program to look for brightly colored objects, which in turn moved the robot into its “aroused” affective state, with a facial expression with the hallmarks of happiness. The happy face, in turn, led the human to feel good about the interaction and to wave the toy some more — a socially gratifying feedback loop akin to playing with a baby.
Kismet is now retired and on permanent display, inert as a bronze statue, at the M.I.T. Museum. The most famous robot now in Breazeal’s lab, the one that the graduate students compete for time with, looks nothing like Kismet. It is a three-foot-tall, head-to-toe creature, sort of a badger, sort of a Yoda, with big eyes, enormous pointy ears, a mouth with soft lips and tiny teeth, a furry belly, furry legs and pliable hands with real-looking fingernails. The reason the robot, called Leonardo (Leo for short), is so lifelike is that it was made by Hollywood animatronics experts at the Stan Winston Studio. (Breazeal consulted with the studio on the construction of the robotic teddy bear in the 2001 Steven Spielberg film “A.I.”) As soon as Leo arrived in the lab, Breazeal said, her students started dismantling it, stripping out all the remote-control wiring and configuring it instead with a brain and body that operated not by remote control but by computer-based artificial intelligence.
I had studied the videos posted on the M.I.T. Media Lab Web site, and I was fond of Leo even before I got to Cambridge. I couldn’t wait to see it close up. I loved the steadiness of its gaze, the slow way it nodded its head and blinked when it understood something, the little Jack Benny shrug it gave when it didn’t. I loved how smart it seemed. In one video, two graduate students, Jesse Gray and Matt Berlin, engaged it in an exercise known in psychology as the false-belief test. Leo performed remarkably. Some psychologists contend that very young children think all minds are permeable and that everyone knows exactly what they themselves know. Older children, after the age of about 4 or 5, have learned that different people have different minds and that it is possible for someone else to hold beliefs that the children themselves know to be false. Leo performed in the video like a sophisticated 5-year-old, one who had developed what psychologists call a theory of mind.
In the video, Leo watches Jesse Gray, who is wearing a red T-shirt, put a bag of chips into Box 1 and a bag of cookies into Box 2, while Matt Berlin, in a brown T-shirt, also watches. After Berlin leaves the room, Gray switches the items, so that now the cookies are in Box 1 and the chips are in Box 2. Gray locks the two boxes and leaves the room, and Leo now knows what Gray knows: the new location for the chips and cookies. But it also knows that Berlin doesn’t know about the switch. Berlin still thinks there are chips in Box 1.
The amazing part comes next. Berlin, in the brown T-shirt, comes back into the room and tries to open the lock on the first box. Leo sees Berlin struggling, and it decides to help by pressing a lever that will deliver to Berlin the item he’s looking for. Leo presses the lever for the chips. It knows that there are cookies in the box that Berlin is trying to open, but it also knows — and this is the part that struck me as so amazing — that Berlin is trying to open the box because he wants chips. It knows that Berlin has a false belief about what is in the first box, and it also knows what Berlin wants. If Leo had indeed passed this important developmental milestone, I wondered, could it also be capable of all sorts of other emotional tasks: empathy, collaboration, social bonding, deception?
Unfortunately, Leo was turned off the day I arrived, inertly presiding over one corner of the lab like a fuzzy Buddha. Berlin and Gray and their colleague, Andrea Thomaz, a postdoctoral researcher, said that they would be happy to turn on the robot for me but that the process would take time and that I would have to come back the next morning. They also wanted to know what it was in particular that I wanted to see Leo do because, it turned out, the robot could go through its paces only when the right computer program was geared up. This was my first clue that Leo maybe wasn’t going to turn out to be quite as clever as I had thought.
When I came back the next day, Berlin and Gray were ready to go through the false-belief routine with Leo. But it wasn’t what I expected. I could now see what I had seen on the video. But in person, I could also peek behind the metaphoric curtain and see something that the video camera hadn’t revealed: the computer monitor that showed what Leo’s cameras were actually seeing and another monitor that showed the architecture of Leo’s brain. I could see that this wasn’t a literal demonstration of a human “theory of mind” at all. Yes, there was some robotic learning going on, but it was mostly a feat of brilliant computer programming, combined with some dazzling Hollywood special effects.
It turned out Leo wasn’t seeing the young men’s faces or bodies; it was seeing something else. Gray and Berlin were each wearing a headband and a glove, which I hadn’t noticed in the video, and the robot’s optical motion tracking system could see nothing but the unique arrangements of reflective tape on their accessories. What the robot saw were bunches of dots. Dots in one geometric arrangement meant Person A; in a different arrangement, they meant Person B. There was a different arrangement of tape on the two different snacks, too, and also on the two different locks for the boxes. On a big monitor alongside Leo was an image of what was going on inside its “brain”: one set of dots represented Leo’s brain; another set of dots represented Berlin’s brain; a third set of dots represented Gray’s. The robot brain was programmed to keep track of it all.
Leo did not learn about false beliefs in the same way a child did. Robot learning, I realized, can be defined as making new versions of a robot’s original instructions, collecting and sorting data in a creative way. So the learning taking place here was not Leo’s ability to keep track of which student believed what, since that skill had been programmed into the robot. The learning taking place was Leo’s ability to make inferences about Gray’s and Berlin’s actions and intentions. Seeing that Berlin’s hand was near the lock on Box 1, Leo had to search through its internal set of task models, which had been written into its computer program, and figure out what it meant for a hand to be moving near a lock and not near, say, a glass of water. Then it had to go back to that set of task models to decide why Berlin might have been trying to open the box — that is, what his ultimate goal was. Finally, it had to convert its drive to be helpful, another bit of information written into its computer program, into behavior. Leo had to learn that by pressing a particular lever, it could give Berlin the chips he was looking for. Leo’s robot learning consisted of integrating the group of simultaneous computer programs with which it had begun.
Leo’s behavior might not have been an act of real curiosity or empathy, but it was an impressive feat nonetheless. Still, I felt a little twinge of disappointment, and for that I blame Hollywood. I’ve been exposed to robot hype for years, from the TV of my childhood — Rosie the robot maid on “The Jetsons,” that weird talking garbage-can robot on “Lost in Space” — to the more contemporary robots-gone-wild of films like “Blade Runner” and “I, Robot.” Despite my basic cold, hard rationalism, I was prepared to be bowled over by a robot that was adorable, autonomous and smart. What I saw in Leo was no small accomplishment in terms of artificial intelligence and the modeling of human cognition, but it was just not quite the accomplishment I had been expecting. I had been expecting something closer to “real.”
Why We Might Want to Hug a Desk Lamp
I had been seduced by Leo’s big brown eyes, just like almost everyone else who encounters the robot, right down to the students who work on its innards. “There we all are, soldering Leonardo’s motors, aware of how it looks from behind, aware that its brain is just a bunch of wires,” Guy Hoffman, a graduate student, told me. Yet as soon as they get in front of it, he said, the students see its eyes move, see its head turn, see the programmed chest motion that looks so much like breathing, and they start talking about Leo as a living thing.
People do the same thing with a robotic desk lamp that Hoffman has designed to move in relation to a user’s motions, casting light wherever it senses the user might need it. It’s just a lamp with a bulky motor-driven neck; it looks nothing like a living creature. But, he said, “as soon as it moves on its own and faces you, you say: ‘Look, it’s trying to help me.’ ‘Why is it doing that?’ ‘What does it want from me?’ ”
When something is self-propelled and seems to engage in goal-directed behavior, we are compelled to interpret those actions in social terms, according to Breazeal. That social tendency won’t turn off when we interact with robots. But instead of fighting it, she said, “we should embrace it so we can design robots in a way that makes sense, so we can integrate robots into our lives.”
The brain activity of people who interacted with Cog and Kismet, and with their successors like Mertz, is probably much the same as the brain activity of someone interacting with a real person. Neuroscientists recently found a collection of brain cells called mirror neurons, which become activated in two different contexts: when someone performs an activity and when someone watches another person perform the same activity. Mirror-neuron activation is thought to be the root of such basic human drives as imitation, learning and empathy. Now it seems that mirror neurons fire not only when watching a person but also when watching a humanoid robot. Scientists at the University of California, San Diego, reported last year that brain scans of people looking at videos of a robotic hand grasping things showed activity in the mirror neurons. The work is preliminary, but it suggests something that people in the M.I.T. robotics labs have already seen: when these machines move, when they direct their gaze at you or lean in your direction, they feel like real creatures.
Would a Robot Make a Better Boyfriend?
Cog, Kismet and Mertz might feel real, but they look specifically and emphatically robotic. Their gears and motors show; they have an appealing retro-techno look, evoking old-fashioned images of the future, not too far from the Elektro robot of the 1939 World’s Fair, which looked a little like the Tin Man of “The Wizard of Oz.” This design was in part a reflection of a certain kind of aesthetic sensibility and in part a deliberate decision to avoid making robots that look too much like us.
Another robot-looking robot is Domo, whose stylized shape somehow evokes the Chrysler Building almost as much as it does a human. It can respond to some verbal commands, like “Here, Domo,” and can close its hand around whatever is placed in its palm, the way a baby does. Shaking hands with Domo feels almost like shaking hands with something alive. The robot’s designer, Aaron Edsinger, has programmed it to do some domestic tricks. It can grab a box of crackers placed in its hand and put it on a shelf and then grab a bag of coffee beans — with a different grip, based on sensors in its mechanical hand — and put it, too, on a shelf. Edsinger calls this “helping with chores.” Domo tracks objects with its big blue eyes and responds to verbal instructions in a high-pitched artificial voice, repeating the words it hears and occasionally adding an obliging “O.K.”
Domo’s looks are just barely humanoid, but that probably works to its advantage. Scientists believe that the more a robot looks like a person, the more favorably we tend to view it, but only up to a point. After that, our response slips into what the Japanese roboticist Masahiro Mori has called the “uncanny valley.” We start expecting too much of the robots because they so closely resemble real people, and when they fail to deliver, we recoil in something like disgust.
If a robot had features that made it seem, say, 50 percent human, 50 percent machine, according to this view, we would be willing to fill in the blanks and presume a certain kind of nearly human status. That is why robots like Domo and Mertz are interpreted by our brains as creaturelike. But if a robot has features that make it appear 99 percent human, the uncanny-valley theory holds that our brains get stuck on that missing 1 percent: the eyes that gaze but have no spark, the arms that move with just a little too much stiffness. This response might be akin to an adaptive revulsion at the sight of corpses. A too-human robot looks distressingly like a corpse that moves.
This zombie effect is one aspect of a new discipline that Breazeal is trying to create called human-robot interaction. Last March, Breazeal and Alan Schultz of the Naval Research Laboratory convened the field’s second annual conference in Arlington, Va., with presentations as diverse as describing how people react to instructions to “kill” a humanoid robot and a film festival featuring videos of human-robot interaction bloopers.
To some observers, the real challenge is not how to make human-robot interaction smoother and more natural but how to keep it from overshadowing, and eventually seeming superior to, a different, messier, more complicated, more flawed kind of interaction — the one between one human and another. Sherry Turkle, a professor in the Program in Science, Technology and Society at M.I.T., worries that sociable robots might be easier to deal with than people are and that one day we might actually prefer our relationships with our machines. A female graduate student once approached her after a lecture, Turkle said, and announced that she would gladly trade in her boyfriend for a sophisticated humanoid robot as long as the robot could produce what the student called “caring behavior.” “I need the feeling of civility in the house,” she told Turkle. “If the robot could provide a civil environment, I would be happy to help produce the illusion that there is somebody really with me.” What she was looking for, the student said, was a “no-risk relationship” that would stave off loneliness; a responsive robot, even if it was just exhibiting scripted behavior, seemed better to her than an unresponsive boyfriend.
The encounter horrified Turkle, who thought it revealed how dangerous, and how seductive, sociable robots could be. “They push our Darwinian buttons,” she told me. Sociable robots are programmed to exhibit the kind of behavior we have come to associate with sentience and empathy, she said, which leads us to think of them as creatures with intentions, emotions and autonomy: “You see a robot like that as a creature; you feel a desire to nurture it. And with this desire comes the fantasy of reciprocation. You begin to care for these creatures and to want the creatures to care about you.”
If Lijin Aryananda, Brooks’s former student, had ever wanted Mertz to “care” about her, she certainly doesn’t anymore. On the day she introduced me to Mertz, Aryananda was heading back to a postdoctoral research position at the University of Zurich. Her new job is in the Artificial Intelligence Lab, and she will still be working with robots, but Aryananda said she wants to get as far away as possible from humanoids and from the study of how humans and robots interact.
“Anyone who tells you that in human-robot interactions the robot is doing anything — well, he is just kidding himself,” she told me, grumpy because Mertz was misbehaving. “Whatever there is in human-robot interaction is there because the human puts it there.”
Nagging, a Killer App
The building and testing of sociable robots remains a research-based enterprise, and when the robots do make their way out of the laboratory, it is usually as part of somebody’s experiment. Breazeal is now overseeing two such projects. One is the work of Cory Kidd, a graduate student who designed and built 17 humanoid robots to serve as weight-loss coaches. The robot coach, a child-size head and torso holding a small touch screen, is called Autom. It is able, using basic artificial-voice software, to speak approximately 1,000 phrases, things like “It’s great that you’re doing well with your exercise” or “You should congratulate yourself on meeting your calorie goals today.” It is programmed to get a little more informal as time goes on: “Hello, I hope that we can work together” will eventually shift to “Hi, it’s good to see you again.” It is also programmed to refer to things that happened on other days, with statements like “It looks like you’ve had a little more to eat than usual recently.”
Kidd is recruiting 15 volunteers from around Boston to take Autom into their homes for six weeks. They will be told to interact with the robot at least once a day, recording food intake and exercise on its touch screen. The plan is to compare their experiences with those of two other groups of 15 dieters each. One group will interact with the same weight-loss coaching software through a touch screen only; the other will record daily food intake and exercise the old-fashioned way, with paper and pen. Kidd said that the study is too short-term to use weight loss as a measure of whether the robot is a useful dieting aid. But at this point, his research questions are more subjective anyway: Do participants feel more connected to the robot than they do to the touch screen? And do they think of that robot on the kitchen counter as an ally or a pest?
Breazeal’s second project is more ambitious. In collaboration with Rod Grupen, a roboticist at the University of Massachusetts in Amherst, she is designing and building four toddler-size robots. Then she will put them into action at the Boston Science Museum for two weeks in June 2009. The robots, which will cost several hundred thousand dollars each, will roll around in what she calls “a kind of robot Romper Room” and interact with a stream of museum visitors. The goal is to see whether the social competencies programmed into these robots are enough to make humans comfortable interacting with them and whether people will be able to help the robots learn to do simple tasks like stacking blocks.
The bare bones of the toddler robots already exist, in the form of a robot designed in Grupen’s lab called uBot-5. A few of these uBots are now being developed for use in assisted-living centers in research designed to see how the robots interact with the frail elderly. Each uBot-5 is about three feet tall, with a big head, very long arms (long enough to touch the ground, should the arms be needed for balance) and two oversize wheels. It has big eyes, rubber balls at the ends of its arms and a video screen for a face. (Breazeal’s version will have sleek torsos, expressive faces and realistic hands.) In one slide that Grupen uses in his PowerPoint presentations, the uBot-5 robot is holding a stethoscope to the chest of a woman lying on the ground after a simulated fall. The uBot is designed to connect by video hookup to a health care practitioner, but still, the image of a robot providing even this level of emergency medical care is, to say the least, disconcerting.
Does It Know It’s a Robot?
More disconcerting still is the image of a robot looking at itself in the mirror and waving hello — a robot with a primitive version of self-awareness. A first step in this direction occurred in September 2004 with reports from Yale about Nico, a humanoid robot. Nico, its designers announced, was able to recognize itself in a mirror. One of its creators, Brian Scassellati, earned his doctorate in 2001 at M.I.T., where he worked on Cog and Kismet — to which Nico bears a family resemblance. Nico has visible workings, a head, arms and torso made of steel and a graceful tilt to its shoulders and neck. Like the M.I.T. robots, Nico has no legs, because Scassellati, now an associate professor of computer science at Yale, wanted to concentrate on what it could do with its upper body and, in particular, the cameras in its eyes.
Here is how Nico learned to recognize itself. The robot had a camera behind its eye, which was pointed toward a mirror. When a reflection came back, Nico was programmed to assign the image a score based on whether it was most likely to be “self,” “another” or “neither.” Nico was also programmed to move its arm, which sent back information to the computer about whether the arm was moving. If the arm was moving and the reflection in the mirror was also moving, the program assigned the image a high probability of being “self.” If the reflection moved but Nico’s arm was not moving, the image was assigned a high probability of being “another.” If the image did not move at all, it was given a high probability of being “neither.”
Nico spent some time moving its arm in front of the mirror, so it could learn when its motor sensors were detecting arm movement and what that looked like through its camera. It learned to give that combination a high score for “self.” Then Nico and Kevin Gold, a graduate student, stood near each other, looking into the mirror, as the robot and the human took turns moving their arms. In 20 runs of the experiment, Nico correctly identified its own moving arm as “self” and Gold’s purposeful flailing as “another.”
One way to interpret this might be to conclude that Nico has a kind of self-awareness, at least when in motion. But that would be quite a leap. Robot consciousness is a tricky thing, according to Daniel Dennett, a Tufts philosopher and author of “Consciousness Explained,” who was part of a team of experts that Rodney Brooks assembled in the early 1990s to consult on the Cog project. In a 1994 article in The Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Dennett posed questions about whether it would ever be possible to build a conscious robot. His conclusion: “Unlikely,” at least as long as we are talking about a robot that is “conscious in just the way we human beings are.” But Dennett was willing to credit Cog with one piece of consciousness: the ability to be aware of its own internal states. Indeed, Dennett believed that it was theoretically possible for Cog, or some other intelligent humanoid robot in the future, to be a better judge of its own internal states than the humans who built it. The robot, not the designer, might some day be “a source of knowledge about what it is doing and feeling and why.”
But maybe higher-order consciousness is not even the point for a robot, according to Sidney Perkowitz, a physicist at Emory. “For many applications,” he wrote in his 2004 book, “Digital People: From Bionic Humans to Androids,” “it is enough that the being seems alive or seems human, and irrelevant whether it feels so.”
In humans, Perkowitz wrote, an emotional event triggers the autonomic nervous system, which sparks involuntary physiological reactions like faster heartbeat, increased blood flow to the brain and the release of certain hormones. “Kismet’s complex programming includes something roughly equivalent,” he wrote, “a quantity that specifies its level of arousal, depending on the stimulus it has been receiving. If Kismet itself reads this arousal tag, the robot not only is aroused, it knows it is aroused, and it can use this information to plan its future behavior.” In this way, according to Perkowitz, a robot might exhibit the first glimmers of consciousness, “namely, the reflexive ability of a mind to examine itself over its own shoulder.”
Robot consciousness, it would seem, is related to two areas: robot learning (the ability to think, to reason, to create, to generalize, to improvise) and robot emotion (the ability to feel). Robot learning has already occurred, with baby steps, in robots like Cog and Leonardo, able to learn new skills that go beyond their initial capabilities. But what of emotion? Emotion is something we are inclined to think of as quintessentially human, something we only grudgingly admit might be taking place in nonhuman animals like dogs and dolphins. Some believe that emotion is at least theoretically possible for robots too. Rodney Brooks goes so far as to say that robot emotions may already have occurred — that Cog and Kismet not only displayed emotions but, in one way of looking at it, actually experienced them.
“We’re all machines,” he told me when we talked in his office at M.I.T. “Robots are made of different sorts of components than we are — we are made of biomaterials; they are silicon and steel — but in principle, even human emotions are mechanistic.” A robot’s level of a feeling like sadness could be set as a number in computer code, he said. But isn’t a human’s level of sadness basically a number, too, just a number of the amounts of various neurochemicals circulating in the brain? Why should a robot’s numbers be any less authentic than a human’s?
“If the mechanistic explanation is right, then one can in principle make a machine which is living,” he said with a grin. That explains one of his longtime ultimate goals: to create a robot that you feel bad about switching off.
The permeable boundary between humanoid robots and humans has especially captivated Kathleen Richardson, a graduate student in anthropology at Cambridge University in England. “I wanted to study what it means to be human, and robots are a great way to do that,” she said, explaining the 18 months she spent in Brooks’s Humanoid Robotics lab in 2003 and 2004, doing fieldwork for her doctorate. “Robots are kind of ambiguous, aren’t they? They’re kind of like us but not like us, and we’re always a bit uncertain about why.”
To her surprise, Richardson found herself just as fascinated by the roboticists at M.I.T. as she was by the robots. She observed a kinship between human and humanoid, an odd synchronization of abilities and disabilities. She tried not to make too much of it. “I kept thinking it was merely anecdotal,” she said, but the connection kept recurring. Just as a portrait might inadvertently give away the painter’s own weaknesses or preoccupations, humanoid robots seemed to reflect something unintended about their designers. A shy designer might make a robot that’s particularly bashful; a designer with physical ailments might focus on the function — touch, vision, speech, ambulation — that gives the robot builder the greatest trouble.
“A lot of the inspiration for the robots seems to come from some kind of deficiency in being human,” Richardson, back in England and finishing her dissertation, told me by telephone. “If we just looked at a machine and said we want the machine to help us understand about being human, I think this shows that the model of being human we carry with us is embedded in aspects of our own deficiencies and limitations.” It’s almost as if the scientists are building their robots as a way of completing themselves.
“I want to understand what it is that makes living things living,” Rodney Brooks told me. At their core, robots are not so very different from living things. “It’s all mechanistic,” Brooks said. “Humans are made up of biomolecules that interact according to the laws of physics and chemistry. We like to think we’re in control, but we’re not.” We are all, human and humanoid alike, whether made of flesh or of metal, basically just sociable machines.

Robin Marantz Henig is a contributing writer. Her last article for the magazine was about evolutionary theories of religion.


Copyright 2007 The New York Times Company

Mining of Data Prompted Fight Over Spying


The National Security Agency (NSA) logo is shown on a computer screen inside the Threat Operations Center at the NSA in Fort Meade, Maryland, January 25, 2006.


Mining of Data Prompted Fight Over Spying
By SCOTT SHANE and DAVID JOHNSTON
July 29, 2007

WASHINGTON, July 28 — A 2004 dispute over the National Security Agency’s secret surveillance program that led top Justice Department officials to threaten resignation involved computer searches through massive electronic databases, according to current and former officials briefed on the program.
It is not known precisely why searching the databases, or data mining, raised such a furious legal debate. But such databases contain records of the phone calls and e-mail messages of millions of Americans, and their examination by the government would raise privacy issues.
The N.S.A.’s data mining has previously been reported. But the disclosure that concerns about it figured in the March 2004 debate helps to clarify the clash this week between Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales and senators who accused him of misleading Congress and called for a perjury investigation.
The confrontation in 2004 led to a showdown in the hospital room of then Attorney General John Ashcroft, where Mr. Gonzales, the White House counsel at the time, and Andrew H. Card Jr., then the White House chief of staff, tried to get the ailing Mr. Ashcroft to reauthorize the N.S.A. program.
Mr. Gonzales insisted before the Senate this week that the 2004 dispute did not involve the Terrorist Surveillance Program “confirmed” by President Bush, who has acknowledged eavesdropping without warrants but has never acknowledged the data mining.
If the dispute chiefly involved data mining, rather than eavesdropping, Mr. Gonzales’ defenders may maintain that his narrowly crafted answers, while legalistic, were technically correct.
But members of the Senate Intelligence Committee, who have been briefed on the program, called the testimony deceptive.
“I’ve had the opportunity to review the classified matters at issue here, and I believe that his testimony was misleading at best,” said Senator Russ Feingold, Democrat of Wisconsin, joining three other Democrats in calling Thursday for a perjury investigation of Mr. Gonzales.
“This has gone on long enough,” Mr. Feingold said. “It is time for a special counsel to investigate whether criminal charges should be brought.”
The senators’ comments, along with those of other members of Congress briefed on the program, suggested that they considered the eavesdropping and data mining so closely tied that they were part of a single program. Both activities, which ordinarily require warrants, were started without court approval as the Bush administration intensified counterterrorism efforts soon after the Sept. 11 attacks.
A half-dozen officials and former officials interviewed for this article would speak only on the condition of anonymity, in part because unauthorized disclosures about the classified program are already the subject of a criminal investigation. Some of the officials said the 2004 dispute involved other issues in addition to the data mining, but would not provide details. They would not say whether the differences were over how the databases were searched or how the resulting information was used.
Nor would they explain what modifications to the surveillance program President Bush authorized to head off the threatened resignations by Justice Department officials.
An agency spokesman declined to comment on the data mining issue but referred a reporter to a statement issued earlier that Mr. Gonzales had testified truthfully.
The Justice Department announced in January that eavesdropping without warrants under the Terrorist Surveillance Program had been halted, and that a special intelligence court was again overseeing the wiretapping. The N.S.A., the nation’s largest intelligence agency, generally eavesdrops on communications in foreign countries. Since the 1978 passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, known as FISA, any eavesdropping to gather intelligence on American soil has required a warrant from the special court.
In addition, court approval is required for the N.S.A. to search the databases of telephone calls or e-mail records, usually compiled by American phone and Internet companies and including phone numbers or e-mail addresses, as well as dates, times and duration of calls and messages. Sometimes called metadata, such databases do not include the content of the calls and e-mail messages — the actual words spoken or written.
Government examination of the records, which allows intelligence analysts to trace relationships between callers and identify possible terrorist cells, is considered less intrusive than actual eavesdropping. But the N.S.A.’s eavesdropping targeted international calls and e-mail messages of people inside the United States, while the databases contain primarily domestic records. The conflict in 2004 appears to have turned on differing interpretations of the president’s power to bypass the FISA law and obtain access to the records.
President Bush has asserted that both his constitutional powers as commander in chief and the authorization for the use of military force passed by Congress after the Sept. 11 attacks gave him legal justification for skirting the warrant requirement. Critics have called the surveillance illegal because it does not comply with the FISA law.
The first known assertion by administration officials that there had been no serious disagreement within the government about the legality of the N.S.A. program came in talks with New York Times editors in 2004. In an effort to persuade the editors not to disclose the eavesdropping program, senior officials repeatedly cited the lack of dissent as evidence of the program’s lawfulness.
In December 2005, The Times published articles describing the program, the data mining and the internal legal debate. The newspaper reported that the N.S.A. had combed large volumes of telephone and Internet traffic in search of patterns that might point to terrorism suspects.
Civil liberties groups, Congressional Democrats and some Republicans reacted to the disclosures with outrage, accusing the administration of operating an illegal surveillance program inside the United States. The uproar grew when USA Today reported in May 2006 more details of the N.S.A.’s acquisition from telephone companies of the phone call databases. In response to the articles, Mr. Bush confirmed the eavesdropping, saying it was limited to communications in and out of the United States involving people suspected of ties to Al Qaeda. He did not, however, confirm the data mining, nor has any other official done so publicly.
Mr. Gonzales defended the surveillance in an appearance before the Senate Judiciary Committee in February 2006, saying there had been no internal dispute about its legality. He told the senators: “There has not been any serious disagreement about the program that the president has confirmed. There have been disagreements about other matters regarding operations, which I cannot get into.”
By limiting his remarks to “the program the president has confirmed,” Mr. Gonzales skirted any acknowledgment of the heated arguments over the data mining. He said the Justice Department had issued a legal analysis justifying the eavesdropping program.
Mr. Bush and other officials also have repeatedly cited Justice Department reviews as evidence of their care in overseeing the program, never mentioning the bitter conflict that unfolded behind the scenes.
Mr. Gonzales’s 2006 testimony went unchallenged publicly until May of this year, when James B. Comey, the former deputy attorney general, described the March 2004 confrontation to the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Mr. Comey had refused to sign a reauthorization for the N.S.A. program when he was standing in for Mr. Ashcroft, who was hospitalized for gall bladder surgery.
Mr. Comey described an intense fight that prompted the top leaders of the Justice Department to consider resigning in protest. Mr. Gonzales and Mr. Card visited the bedside of Mr. Ashcroft, who was in pain and under sedation, to seek his signature on the reauthorization.
Mr. Ashcroft refused to do so. Mr. Comey testified that he thought the White House officials were trying to take advantage of a sick man.
On Tuesday, to respond to Mr. Comey’s account, Mr. Gonzales testified in a Senate appearance that he went to the hospital only after meeting with Congressional leaders about the impending deadline for the reauthorization. He said the consensus was that the program should go on, so he felt he had no choice but to seek Mr. Ashcroft’s approval.
At the hearing, Mr. Gonzales faced harsh questioning about why he had not previously acknowledged the 2004 standoff. In response, he asserted once again that there had not been disagreements about the surveillance program, insisting that the dispute involved “other intelligence activities.”
After the hearing, Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Democrat of Vermont and chairman of the Judiciary Committee, sent Mr. Gonzales a transcript of his testimony with pointed instructions — to “correct, clarify or supplement your answers so that, consistent with your oath, they are the whole truth.”

Copyright 2007 The New York Times Company

Friday, July 27, 2007

Psychologists have identified 237 reasons why men and women have sex.




Fancy burning some calories and getting closer to God?
Those are just two of the 237 reasons, according to largest ever study of its kind, that men and women give for having sex
By Roger Dobson
Published: 15 July 2007

Psychologists have identified 237 reasons why men and women have sex.
While love and attraction remain the clincher for many, for others it is about getting closer to God; gaining a promotion; revenge; or a way to get rid of a tension headache.
Some of those asked said it was a reasonably effective way of overcoming boredom or burning up calories, while a few were attracted by the idea that it kept them warm, helped them fall asleep, or eased the stress of the day.
The results of the biggest study of people's motivation for sex show that men are more likely to spring into action for physical reasons than women, whose motives were more likely to be based on emotions. Women were much more likely to say: ''I realised that I was in love." Men were more likely to say: "I wanted to increase the number of partners I had experienced."
"We identified 237 distinct reasons why people have sex," the researchers said. "The study provides perhaps the most comprehensive exploration to date of the reasons people give for having sexual intercourse. They ranged from the mundane – 'It feels good' – to the spiritual – 'I wanted to feel closer to God'. They ranged from altruistic – 'I wanted the person to feel good' to manipulative – 'I wanted to get a promotion'."
For the two-part study, reported in the Archives of Sexual Behavior this week, psychologists at the University of Texas quizzed more than 2,000 men and women aged 17 to 52.
"Why people have sex is a surprisingly little studied topic. One reason for its relative neglect is that scientists might simply assume that the answers are obvious," say the researchers.
While being attracted to the other person was the main reason for both men and women, the results show that for some the reasons were not so mainstream. Each of the 237 reasons was given the highest rating by at least one of the people taking part.
"The frequently endorsed reasons for having sex, reflect what motivates most people most of the time: attraction, pleasure, affection, love, romance, emotional closeness, arousal, the desire to please, adventure, excitement and opportunity," say the psychologists.
"The less frequently endorsed reasons, however, may be no less important. One person's seemingly trivial reason for having sex might well be another's magnificent obsession."

Catholicism alive in China


THE PAST AND THE FUTURE: Bishop Jin Luxian and his chosen successor, Joseph Xing Wenzhi. Photo by Ritsu Shinozaki

The Atlantic Monthly | July/August 2007

Keeping Faith

Jin Luxian’s 50-year struggle to keep Catholicism alive in China, balance Rome and Beijing, and build a Church for “100 million Catholics”

by Adam Minter

O n a June day in 1982, Father Aloysius Jin Luxian, a 66-year-old Jesuit just released from prison, walked into Shanghai’s St. Ignatius Cathedral for the first time in 27 years. In his youth, the building had been one of the great churches in East Asia, celebrated for its delicate Gothic arches and colorful stained glass. Now the color was gone, replaced by clear glass and harsh sunlight that bleached the cracked columns and tiled floor. The steeples, once among the tallest in Shanghai, were missing, as was the altar beneath which he’d been ordained, in 1945. Jin had spent nearly three decades under house arrest, in reeducation camps, and in prison, so he had few illusions about the Chinese Communist Party’s attitude toward religion. But the damage to the church was still hard to bear. St. Ignatius, he learned, had been converted to a grain warehouse during the Cultural Revolution, and the authorities had spent three days burning most of the diocese’s Catholic books in front of the church.

Now services were being held again. But open prayers for the pope were strictly prohibited, and scant mention of the holy father could be found in any of the crudely printed books used in the cathedral. Mass was still in Latin, unintelligible to most Chinese. The current bishop had been ordained without approval from Rome, by a Communist government determined to erase the memory of Shanghai’s still-incarcerated bishop, Ignatius Kung (Gong) Pin-mei. Everything was under the direct control of the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association, the 25-year-old government agency that oversaw Chinese Catholic life.

Yet on Saturday nights, the church was packed, its pews filled with 2,500 or more parishioners. Morning Mass wasn’t quite as crowded, but it happened, and regularly. Elsewhere in Shanghai, four more Catholic churches were holding services, and they, too, were packed on Saturday nights. All these parishioners were attended to by 60 elderly priests, who’d submitted to living together in a single house, under strict CPA supervision, because they were determined to live openly as Catholic priests.

Priests had other options, including a nascent “underground” movement, whose members refused to worship in churches registered with the Religious Affairs Bureau, which oversaw the CPA. During the later years of his incarceration, Jin had become familiar with several priests who belonged to this movement, and he’d been impressed by their courage and piety. But the catastrophe that befell China’s Catholics in the 1950s had convinced him that the underground movement, with its determination to confront the Communist Party, would never be able to provide a stable spiritual home for the thousands of Catholics who openly attended Mass in Shanghai every week.

Jin had once hoped that a distinctively Chinese Church would replace the missionary Church of his youth, reconciling his devout Roman Catholicism with his Chinese identity. The old attempts at reconciliation had failed because they’d emphasized one identity over the other, leaving a church that seemed neither authentically Catholic nor Chinese. But now, with Rome separated from its Chinese followers, there was an opportunity to create a truly Chinese Church—for Jin, and for the Catholics he aspired to lead.

photo
BISHOP JIN in front of the restored stained-
glass windows in the Shanghai cathedral

T wenty-five years later, Father Jin—now bishop of Shanghai—sat across from me in his third-floor office, facing the cathedral’s restored steeples. “It was heartbreaking,” he said of the day he returned to the cathedral, and threw up his hands. “But what could I do?” We were talking in English, one of the five languages he speaks fluently. At 91, he’s a slight man, maybe five and a half feet tall, but his stiff posture gives him a sturdy presence, and when he took my hand to emphasize a point, I felt the metal of his bishop’s ring.

Though largely unknown outside of China, Jin is arguably the most influential and controversial figure in Chinese Catholicism of the last 50 years. He played a leading role in persuading the authorities to allow a prayer for the pope to be said during Masses in China’s registered, or “open,” churches and in developing a Chinese-language liturgy, and he was single-handedly responsible for training more than 400 priests—including several who became Vatican-recognized bishops—in Shanghai’s seminary. He’s also been an unabashed supporter of dialogue and compromise with the Communist government. He accepted ordination as a bishop without Vatican approval and has taken a leading role in China’s open churches, all of which still have to register with the Religious Affairs Bureau and are overseen by bishops appointed by the CPA in consultation with local congregations.

Defying canon law, as Jin has done on several occasions, is no small matter for a Catholic bishop. But Rome has tolerated his disobedience, largely because of what he’s accomplished in Shanghai. From his modern office, Jin looks out over a diocese that includes 141 registered churches, 74 priests (most under the age of 40), 86 nuns, 83 seminarians, and 150,000 laypeople. In Shanghai, at least, there’s been a significant rapprochement between the underground Church and the open one, particularly on the leadership level: Jin is the most prominent Chinese open-Church bishop who recognizes, albeit quietly, the authority of the pope.

Indeed, the line between China’s open and underground churches has been blurring for some time. There are members of the underground Church who still refuse to worship in open churches or to recognize the legitimacy of open-Church bishops. The open Church tends to be much more in line with the reforms of the Second Vatican Council, which translated the Mass into the vernacular and elevated the role of the laity; the underground Church tends to be nostalgic for the more hierarchical pre–Vatican II Church. But the reality of day-to-day life in the underground Church is more complex than the popular image of Christian believers hidden in Chinese catacombs would suggest. At least 90 percent of open-Church bishops have quietly reconciled with Rome, just as Jin did. In at least one diocese, a priest who served in the open Church was also ordained as an underground bishop. In other dioceses, underground priests have been known to hold Mass in open churches, often using missals and Bibles that Jin had translated and printed.

Nevertheless, the underground Church continues to be targeted by local governments wary of any social movement that refuses to recognize their authority (the national government is more tolerant). The harassment is most pronounced in rural areas, where many Catholics don’t have access to priests or registered churches. But Catholics are sometimes still persecuted in the cities, and today more than two dozen underground priests and bishops are reportedly in government custody.

Jin does not dismiss the suffering of underground Catholics, but he seems to believe it’s unnecessary, now that the sacraments are available in open churches. Explaining why accommodation, rather than resistance, is the right path for Chinese Catholics, he says his flock is in no position to confront the Chinese government, particularly at the behest of the wealthy overseas supporters of the underground Church. “I don’t wait for [the Communist] collapse,” he says. “I get things done now.” Besides, he adds, from the 1950s onward, he realized that Communist secret police “are everywhere, like God. So we can’t do secret activities. It’s stupid.”

Cardinal Theodore McCarrick of Washington, D.C., a friend and admirer of Jin for nearly two decades, told me, “What I like about Jin is that he’s very Chinese and very Catholic at the same time.” It’s why McCarrick calls him “one of the most important churchmen in China of our time.” Jin isn’t so optimistic about his legacy. “The Vatican thinks that I don’t work enough for the Vatican, and the government thinks that I work too much for the Vatican,” he says. “It is not easy to satisfy both.”

Jin says that from the beginning his primary interest has been poor Catholics in China, “my Catholics.” Neither Beijing nor Rome has always had their best interests at heart, he suggests, and so he’s tried to step into the breach. In the process, he’s become a different sort of Catholic than he was when he was ordained (by a French priest, he points out)—a personal transformation that’s mirrored by the changes at work in China’s growing population of Catholics, both underground and open.

C hristianity first reached China in the seventh century, carried by Nestorians via the Silk Road, but it wasn’t until the mid-16th century, with the arrival of the Society of Jesus, that the Catholic Church established a permanent presence in the Middle Kingdom. After that, the faith made substantial inroads, thanks to Matteo Ricci, a brilliant Italian Jesuit who abandoned traditional evangelization techniques in favor of an “enculturated” approach that accommodated traditional Chinese beliefs and rituals, including the commonplace practice of venerating one’s ancestors.

The Jesuits’ tolerance for these “Chinese rites” generated controversy back in Rome, and in 1704, after a century of debate, Pope Clement XI was persuaded by the Jesuits’ rivals to condemn them as hopelessly tainted by superstition. The Chinese emperors, who’d been tolerant of the missionaries, were outraged—as Jin notes, “To be Chinese, it was most important to venerate ancestors”—and during the 1720s missionaries and then Christianity itself were banned in China.

Catholic missionaries reentered China a century later, thanks to the 1842 treaties that opened the Chinese mainland to both opium and European Christians. French Jesuits built their headquarters on the edge of the small fishing village of Shanghai, and soon after raised Shanghai’s first cathedral, a wooden predecessor to St. Ignatius that was completed in 1910. Catholicism—and Christianity in general—grew steadily in China throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, and by the outbreak of World War I, Chinese Catholics numbered 1.2 million.

Jin claims that the first members of his family converted to Catholicism more than 10 generations ago, while they were servants in the house of a Shanghai aristocrat. His childhood was beset by tragedy: At 10 he lost his mother, at 14 his father, and at 18 his only sibling, an older sister. (“And yet I live to a very old age,” he observes. “Very curious, yes?”) His family had enrolled him in Shanghai’s Jesuit-run schools, and he entered the order in 1938, the year he turned 22. “I had lost everyone,” he says. “So I looked to be a soldier for God.”

Jin had always seen similarities between Catholicism and Chinese culture. Like many Chinese Christians, he was attracted to the Gospel of John and its mystical concept of Logos—or “the Word,” as embodied in Christ. “The Logos is like Chinese philosophy,” he says, referring to the Tao, a concept sometimes translated as “the Way.” Both the Tao and Logos, he explains, suggest a rational order in the universe, though in the case of Catholicism, that order is revealed physically in the figure of Christ.

Reconciling Chinese philosophy with Catholic theology was easier than reconciling the political demands of his two masters in this world. The year after Jin entered the Jesuit order, Pope Pius XII ended most of the restrictions on the Chinese rites, and in 1946 he established an independent hierarchy for China’s Church, so that it was no longer a missionary project. But there was still tension between being Catholic and being Chinese. As late as 1949, more than 80 percent of China’s dioceses remained under the control of European bishops who had little interest in relinquishing their sees to the Chinese. Like the pope and the Vatican hierarchy, many of these bishops—under the direction of Archbishop Antonio Riberi, the papal internuncio to China—supported Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese Nationalists, even after 1949, when the Communists triumphed and Chiang’s government fled to Taiwan. That created an identity crisis for Catholics on the mainland, many of whom shared Jin’s perception that the Communist victory marked “the recovery by China of full independence as well as her national self-respect.” As Jin remarked in a 1987 speech to German Catholics, “To remain Catholic, they could not remain Chinese.”

When the Communists swept into power, Jin was in Rome working on his doctorate in theology at the Pontifical Gregorian University. By the time he graduated, in 1950, Beijing had begun to restrict religious freedoms and expel foreign missionaries. “I knew that I would be arrested if I returned to China,” Jin says matter-of-factly. He returned anyway. “The missionaries were leaving, and China needed pastors.”

In 1951, in an attempt to persuade the Communists not to view the Church as a hostile, foreign-controlled entity, Jin proposed creating a conference of Chinese bishops that would run the Church in a manner that reflected Chinese, not European, interests. He was promptly reported to the papal internuncio, whose response, he says with a laugh, was: “This young priest talks nonsense!” Rebuked, Jin spent the next four years as the rector of Shanghai’s major seminary, training as many Chinese priests as possible to replace the departed missionaries.

But by then, little could be done to help China’s Catholics. The Communists had expelled Riberi in 1951 and officially severed diplomatic relations with the Vatican. Ignatius Kung Pin-mei, the bishop of Shanghai, emerged as China’s leading Catholic voice against the Communists. Jin considered Kung a friend but disagreed with his confrontational approach. “Kung believed that the Nationalists would win and come back,” he says. “I said, ‘No. How? It’s a small island—how can they conquer [mainland] China?’”

On September 8, 1955, Kung and Jin were arrested, along with 300 priests, nuns, and laypeople (an additional 800 Catholics were arrested a few weeks later). For the next five years, Jin was kept mostly in solitary confinement in Shanghai, his only human contact with the interrogators and the guards. He was allowed no books or other written materials. When I asked how he survived that period, he smiled and said that he’d memorized the Gospels as a young man. “I kept my faith, by praying and meditating on the Gospels, especially John.”

In 1960, Jin was convicted of counterrevolutionary activities and received an 18-year sentence. Kung was convicted of high treason and received a life sentence. Jin spent the ensuing years in various prisons and reeducation camps, where he worked as a farmer and, off and on, as a translator of foreign documents for the national Public Security Bureau. Ironically, after he finally got access to newspapers during the Cultural Revolution, his hope was shaken in a way it hadn’t been when he was in solitary confinement. “I heard that China was an atheist nation—that the missions, churches, Catholics, Buddhist temples, and Islamic mosques were all gone,” he says. “And I nearly lost my hope.” He pauses. “Almost.” Prayer sustained him, as it does today: Every morning, promptly at 7:30, he says a private Mass with a single attendant in the chapel next to his study. “I still pray the rosary,” he notes. “Now I have beads, and I didn’t in jail.”

Though Jin’s sentence was completed in the mid- ’70s, he remained a political prisoner in northern China until 1982. “I entered [prison] a young man,” he says, “and left an old one.” He emerged to find a Chinese Church that had been utterly transformed. In July 1957, at the behest of the Communist Party, a small group of Chinese Catholic leaders had held the first meeting of the Catholic Patriotic Association, whose stated policy was to ensure that “Chinese Catholics, cleric and lay, take charge of their own affairs and no longer act contrary to the interests of their country.” A year later, two Chinese bishops were ordained without papal approval, and over the next seven years, 49 more would be—until the Cultural Revolution ended the government’s limited toleration for religion.

The Vatican saw the ordinations as an affront, and Pope Pius XII wrote an encyclical letter reasserting his right to select bishops—and to excommunicate anyone who circumvented him. However, neither he nor his successors excommunicated any of the bishops consecrated under Communist supervision. Instead, the Vatican quietly recognized that, despite the illicit procedure, the bishops had been ordained by valid prelates, and thus were valid themselves. According to Anthony S. K. Lam, a scholar of the Chinese Church at Hong Kong’s Holy Spirit Study Centre, the “illicit but valid” designation is well-known. “If you are ordained by an illicit but valid bishop, you are a valid bishop,” he says. “But only the pope can say you are the bishop of Shanghai.”

When Jin emerged from prison in 1982, Shanghai had two bishops: Ignatius Kung Pin-mei, who was still incarcerated, and Aloysius Zhang Jiashu, a 90-year-old Jesuit who’d been consecrated under Communist supervision in 1960. Many in the city’s elderly Catholic community held Kung in the highest regard, but Zhang was a more controversial figure. The situation epitomized the larger dilemma facing Chinese Catholics: how to reconcile the Church that had spent more than a generation underground with the Church that was tainted by its links to Communism and estranged from the Holy See.

But an important fact was pushing the two churches toward reconciliation, or at least coexistence: Catholicism was growing. In 1980, China officially had 3 million Catholics (likely an underestimate due to poor census data), the same number it had had in 1949. Today, the best estimates place the Catholic population between 12 million and 15 million. No single explanation accounts for this increase, which is mirrored by the growth of other Christian denominations, but many people, including Jin, think that religion has been filling the vacuum created by the collapse of Marxism’s ideological credibility. Whatever the cause, the exploding numbers have reinforced the need to hold the Church in China together, despite the forces that threaten to tear it apart. This is the mission that has defined Jin’s career—one that began when he stepped out of prison and onto the tightrope he’s walked ever since.

W ithin a few months of Jin’s release, the Communist Central Committee published Document 19, the official policy on religion. Following party dogma, it declared religion to be a historical phenomenon that would disappear once socialism’s triumph was complete. In the interim, it called for steps that would strengthen the independence of Chinese religious institutions and insulate them from negative foreign influences, steps that included the reopening of seminaries to train a new generation of patriotic priests.

Under this policy, Jin was asked to take up his old responsibilities as rector of Shanghai’s seminary. Though the CPA would be looking over his shoulder, he saw the necessity: In all of China, there were at most 400 priests to serve 3 million Catholics. He believed that if the Church was to have any chance of survival, China would need young, well-educated priests, even if they were subjected to Communist propaganda during their training. Through a “foreign friend,” Jin requested permission from Rome. The response was that he should “wait for the collapse” of the Communist Party, then reopen the seminary. “They underestimated the Chinese Communist Party,” says Jin. And so, after “much prayer,” he acted in what he believed to be the best interests of China’s Catholics. “I didn’t obey the directive of Rome. I said, ‘Let the Catholic Church survive.’”

Initially at least, there was little to suggest that the seminary was Catholic. Without Vatican support, Jin had to look elsewhere for books and Bibles. “I had to go to Protestants,” he says. That set a precedent, and though he says he tries to obtain support and funding from Roman Catholic organizations whenever possible, since the early 1980s the Shanghai diocese has received significant funding for religious publishing and book purchases from non-Catholic Christian organizations sympathetic to his desire “to proclaim the word of God.”

Such developments didn’t help Jin’s already tenuous standing in Rome. “Once, I was present when John Paul [II] was given testimony on the dramatic suffering of the underground in Shanghai,” recalls Jeroom Heyndrickx, a Belgian priest who has served as an informal Vatican emissary to the Chinese Church since the early 1980s. “And then you hear that a man like Jin comes out and is officially recognized. That puts him in a very bad light.”

Jin’s fellow Jesuits in Taiwan were particularly critical of his approach. “In the early ’80s they accused me of being a traitor,” he says. “They said I was a secret Communist. They accused me of becoming a party member in prison and being a traitor to the Church.” Sighing, he adds, “Rome believed it”—for most of the 1980s, “people abroad considered me a Judas.”

Despite the negative reports that made their way to Rome, John Paul II showed a strong sympathy for China’s Church. As a former bishop of Krakow, he seemed to understand instinctively the compromises made by China’s Catholics, and in several speeches and encyclicals, he indicated his support for open as well as underground believers. According to Heyndrickx and two other people who closely observed Vatican China policy in the 1980s, John Paul II and his inner circle developed a positive perception of Jin in the mid-’80s, mostly as a result of reports emanating out of the newly reopened seminary. Heyndrickx recalls being asked by the pope to assess Jin’s character, and responding, “If he is not faithful, then neither am I.”

Jin’s loyalty was put to the test in January 1985, when he was chosen by Shanghai’s priests and the CPA to be ordained an auxiliary bishop (an assistant and possible successor) to Bishop Zhang. Few inside or outside of Shanghai believed that it was possible for Jin to remain a faithful Catholic—at least, a Roman Catholic—if he accepted the ordination. Yet Jin believed that to reject the appointment would not only place the seminary at risk but also open the Shanghai hierarchy to a priest more inclined toward the CPA and the Communist Party. Reluctantly, he accepted, and he says that on the day of the ordination, he was in need of “consolation.”

It arrived from an unlikely source: With Pope John Paul’s knowledge and tacit approval, Laurence Murphy, a past president of Seton Hall University and an informal intermediary and adviser to the Vatican on the Chinese Church, and Father John Tong, now the auxiliary bishop of Hong Kong, attended the ceremony. “That was kind of delicate,” Murphy told me, recalling that St. Ignatius was filled with “brass from the CPA.” Jin concedes that there might have been serious consequences had the CPA been aware of a Vatican-approved presence, and he admitted that Murphy and Tong had attended the ordination only after I asked him to confirm Murphy’s account. “It was not encouraged by me,” he said defensively. “I did not apply for that.” After a pause, he added, “They encouraged me, and it was helpful and consolation.”

I n 1982, shortly after he was released from prison, Jin petitioned the government to allow him to visit the imprisoned Bishop Kung. He was allowed to make three visits before Kung was released, in 1985 (with Jin signing a personal guarantee of his good behavior). Kung lived in Shanghai under house arrest, accepting visitors and maintaining friendly relations with Jin, who says Kung was “like a brother” at the time. Then in 1988, the same year that Bishop Zhang died and Jin succeeded him as the government-approved head of the Shanghai diocese, Kung received permission to seek medical treatment abroad, and after it was completed, he went into exile, living at his nephew’s home in Connecticut.

According to an American Church official involved in making the Vatican’s China policy, the Vatican strongly preferred that Kung remain in China, because it believed that he was uniquely positioned to heal the rift in China’s Church. Instead, against the wishes of John Paul II but with the tacit support of high-ranking Vatican officials who sympathized with the underground, Kung, working with his nephew, began deepening the rift. The situation grew even more confused when it was revealed that the pope had named Kung a cardinal in pectore—“in secret”—in 1979, during his imprisonment. Kung and his nephew formed the Cardinal Kung Foundation, a U.S.-based nonprofit that supports and agitates on behalf of the underground Church. For Jin, a favorite target of foundation attacks, Kung’s status and activities were an affront. “Cardinal Kung pushes all of the Catholics against the Chinese Communist Party, then he moves to the United States,” he says. “Very nice for him.” Jin has traveled abroad extensively (the government allows him to go anywhere but Rome), and he likes to point out that he too has plenty of “foreign friends” who could support him in exile if he chose that.

Instead, Jin used his standing as a bishop to begin the reforms that he’d wanted to see in China’s Church since the 1940s. In 1988, he made six trips to Beijing in hopes of persuading the Religious Affairs Bureau to, among other things, allow him to include a prayer for the pope in his diocese’s services; he obtained permission on the sixth visit. The next year, he received permission to have two Hong Kong priests and an American priest teach at the seminary. Soon after their arrival, the priests began preparing the seminarians to say Mass in the vernacular, and on September 30, 1989, the first Chinese-language Mass was celebrated in Shanghai. Father Joseph Zen, a Shanghai native and now the cardinal archbishop of Hong Kong, was the celebrant. The risk was significant: China’s religious authorities reserved the right to approve changes to the liturgy, and they’d long preferred Latin, largely because it couldn’t be understood by most Chinese.

Over the next several months, Jin says, he quietly ordered his priests and seminarians to take the new liturgy to Shanghai’s other churches. “Jin was the one who had the guts to implement the Mass,” says Father Thomas Law, a Hong Kong liturgist who was involved in the Mass at the chapel. “Nobody else.” The Chinese-language Mass wasn’t officially authorized on a national level until 1993. Soon afterward, the Shanghai diocese published its own translation, which was quickly disseminated throughout the country.

It was characteristic Jin. He has keen political instincts, and throughout his career he’s been able to use his standing as an open-Church bishop to achieve things that he never could have done in the underground Church. Though Jin won’t discuss his relationships with Chinese officials, those close to him claim that he has good relations at a very high level in Beijing and Shanghai. It’s a delicate balancing act, says Jeroom Heyndrickx: “He had to say things that sound correct to the regime that also protect his church.”

During one of our interviews, Jin contrasted himself with the outspoken Joseph Zen, who has become a well-known agitator against the CPA since taking over as archbishop of Hong Kong. “You cannot speak out as a bishop in a Communist country,” Jin says. “I can’t freely speak like Zen, because I must protect my diocese.” Withholding criticism of China’s religious authorities and their policies is perhaps the greatest compromise that the open-Church bishops choose to make.

At the same time, there are lines that Jin won’t cross. In the early 1990s, for instance, he was offered the chairmanship of the government-organized Chinese bishops’ conference, but declined the overture because he thought it would compromise his independence. The role was later assumed by Beijing’s Bishop Fu Tieshen, who, after his death in April 2007, was widely criticized for being little more than a mouthpiece for the Communist Party.

In conversation, Jin exhibits few doubts about his decisions, but occasionally his answers turn defensive. During one of our interviews, I asked about his impressions of the underground Church. He began to answer, then suddenly interrupted himself. “[The members of the underground Church] say they are loyal to the pope,” he said. “But I am as loyal as them. Why become bishop? I led the [Chinese] Catholics to pray for the pope and even printed the prayer! I reformed the liturgy. Before me, it was all in Latin. But the underground Church did nothing. If I stayed with them, I would do nothing, too.”

C ardinal McCarrick told me that he and Jin had a routine during the 1990s: “I would tell him, ‘I am going to visit the holy father soon. Is there anything that you would like me to tell him?’ And he would answer, ‘Tell the holy father that he has my prayers and blessings.’ And I would ask, ‘Anything else?’ And he would answer, ‘And the blessings of my priests, sisters, and congregations.’ And anything else? And he would pause and say, ‘Not at this time.’”

During the 1990s, according to several of his friends, Jin was frustrated that despite his accomplishments, he could not be recognized as the rightful bishop of Shanghai. (By 2000, roughly two-thirds of the open-Church bishops were reconciled with Rome.) Laurence Murphy says the reason was that Jin was unwilling to communicate, in writing or orally, that he was loyal to the pope. “Along with many others, he believed that the Vatican had been infiltrated by the Communists,” says Murphy. “And they didn’t want to trust anything to that bureaucracy, because they thought, ‘In 24 hours it will be known in Beijing.’”

Many in the Vatican doubted Jin’s loyalties well into the 1990s, in part because of allegations made by the Kung Foundation and others sympathetic to the underground Church. Kung himself ultimately refused to meet Jin in the United States, even though the Vatican had asked them to sit down together and try to repair the divide. Kung died in exile in 1999, and his auxiliary, Fan Zhongliang (who lived in Shanghai), succeeded him.

In 2000, at the behest of the Vatican, Fan visited Jin at his office in the basilica near the seminary. At the time, both bishops were in their 80s, and the Vatican had asked them to agree upon a successor. Their candidate would be submitted to the pope, then presented to the diocese’s priests for election and to the CPA for approval. At the very least, the Vatican intended to make clear that the auxiliary bishop would be an open-Church bishop, and that Fan—as an underground bishop—would have no successor. And if all went as planned, the two faces of Shanghai’s Church could be officially unified.

Fan proposed a priest who Jin says “didn’t know the diocese, and the diocese didn’t know him.” Jin’s preferred candidate, Joseph Xing Wenzhi, was unacceptable to Fan. During the years that followed, Fan became incapacitated by Alzheimer’s, a turn of events that Heyndrickx says gave the Vatican the opportunity to secretly recognize Jin as the de jure bishop of Shanghai (in the Vatican’s eyes, Jin is officially the coadjutor of the diocese). Jin will neither confirm nor deny that status, but it’s unquestioned among Church leaders in Europe and North America, and it was tacitly acknowledged at the June 2005 public consecration of Xing as Jin’s auxiliary. Had Jin not been reconciled with Rome, Xing’s ordination would have been declared illicit. Instead, it was attended by Vatican emissaries, hundreds of laypeople from the underground Church, several underground priests, and more than a dozen government representatives.

I n the months surrounding Xing’s ordination, Beijing hinted that the ascension of Pope Benedict XVI might offer an opportunity for a deal with Rome, and Benedict seemed to signal a desire to work with the Communist government. That September, he personally invited four mainland Chinese bishops, including Jin, to attend the Synod of the Eucharist in Rome the following month. The government refused on the bishops’ behalf, decrying Vatican interference in China’s affairs, but the point had been made: Jin and the two other open-Church bishops were legitimate in the eyes of the new pope. Jin left the Vatican’s letter of invitation on his desk for a month, explaining to anyone who asked that it “justified everything [he] had done.”

Then, as now, Beijing had two conditions for normalizing relations with the Vatican: the severing of the Vatican’s diplomatic ties with Taiwan (and as a consequence, the transfer of its embassy to the mainland) and an agreement not to interfere in China’s internal affairs. The Vatican has indicated that it’s prepared to meet the Taiwan condition, but the second issue, which encompasses the selection of bishops, is more difficult. Informally, the Vatican might be satisfied with a compromise similar to the process used to nominate Xing in Shanghai. However, public declarations to the contrary, it’s been suggested that both the government and the underground Church have a tacit interest in preventing a deal, since it would inevitably empower the open bishops and their conference, diminishing the government’s influence and the underground Church’s prestige.

Whether an immediate way can be found through the impasse may depend on what Benedict XVI has to say in a promised letter to Chinese Catholics. Leaked reports and the impressions of a source close to the drafting of the letter suggest that it will call, as John Paul II did, for reconciliation between the open and underground churches, and focus largely on pastoral concerns. Ultimately, it’s expected to portray China’s Catholics as largely united after a half century and to acknowledge that any diplomatic solution will need to accommodate both the vitality of the open Church and the struggles of the underground one.

Jin has watched the diplomatic ebb and flow between Rome and Beijing for 20 years, and he’s pessimistic about the short-term prospects for a deal. If he’s wrong, and rapprochement occurs suddenly, China’s Church could change dramatically: The Chinese hierarchy—still split between underground and open bishops in many dioceses—would be reunited, which could smooth over divisions within the Church, but also reopen old wounds. For now, though, Jin’s attempt at an intermediate way still seems likely to chart the future for China’s Catholics.

O f the many goals that Bishop Jin set for himself after leaving prison, none was more personal than the restoration of Shanghai’s cathedral. Over the two decades that followed, the steeples were replaced, the walls and columns were repaired, and a new altar was built. But cost constraints meant that the hundreds of Gothic window frames had to be filled with clear, rather than stained, glass. Even so, Jin did not give up hope that he might once again see the church lit with a mysterious glow, as it had been in his youth.

In 1991, while in Beijing on Church business, Jin was introduced to Wo Ye, the then 28-year-old daughter of Communist Party officials and a recent convert to Catholicism. Trained as a traditional porcelain painter, Wo was working as a newspaper art director. The two became fast friends, and Jin invited her to work for the Shanghai diocese as an artist. Since she had no training in church art, he offered to send her abroad for nearly a decade of study at Catholic institutions in Italy and the United States. Wo agreed, a first step toward restoring the stained glass.

In 2001, after Wo returned to China, formal planning for the project began. Work started the following year, with Wo supervising a staff of nuns from the diocese, and in the fall of 2006, they completed the first stage: 44 windows in ground-level nave chapels depicting the life of Jesus.

The results look nothing like the stained-glass windows of Europe. Images of Christ’s life are executed as variations on traditional Chinese paper cutouts, and the surrounding grillwork is based on Qing Dynasty window designs found in a busy Shanghai market. Chinese iconography complements the Gospel story—a magpie represents the birth of Christ, a coiled phoenix represents the risen Christ—and blazing Chinese characters explain the scenes. Over the next several years, the plan is to fill the upper-level windows with a golden bamboo garden meant to represent paradise and the middle level with figures important to China’s Church, rendered in a fashion that suggests traditional Chinese painting. “The old church appealed to 3 million Catholics,” says Jin. “I want to appeal to 100 million Catholics.”

During my last interview with Jin, Wo stopped by the office to say hello, settling into a chair beside the bishop. The conversation drifted, and Jin told a story that neither Wo nor I had heard before. In the late 1980s, he said, the Italian government invited him to Rome. Zhou Ziyang, then China’s prime minister, gave him permission to go. “The Chinese say, ‘Go and get the real feeling of the Holy See toward China,’” Jin said. “At the time, Zhou Ziyang was ready to normalize relations.” The Vatican was not. “Rome refused me.”

A priest close to the Vatican later wrote to me to say that he’d heard this “rumor” and speculated that Rome had refused permission because of Jin’s poor standing with people in Shanghai’s underground Church. Jin didn’t tell me this. Instead, he looked across the room at Wo, smiled, and asked when the cathedral would be completed.

“In time,” she answered.

The URL for this page is http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200707/chinese-bishop.

Also See:

Interviews: "A Church for China"
Adam Minter discusses his article about Bishop Jin Luxian, the future of Catholicism in China, and life as a writer in Shanghai.

Flashbacks: "The Cross and the Star"
Articles from The Atlantic's archives illuminate the history of China's complex relationship with Christianity.


Follow-up:
In a letter dated May 27, 2007, and released at the end of June, Pope Benedict called for reconciliation among China's divided Catholics.

Click here to read Pope Benedict's letter.

Click here to read the Vatican's explanatory note.

Click here to read an analysis of the letter by Jeroom Heyndrickx, a Belgian priest who has served as a Vatican emissary to the Chinese Church since the early 1980s.